The Effect of Military Doctrine on Main Battle Tank Design and Specifications
Almost every country in the world has a distinct military doctrine. The doctrine is influenced by various factors in the country itself, starting from geographic to economic factors. Apart from individual states, there is also a collective doctrine used by several countries that are members of one alliance, including countries that are members of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As NATO and the Warsaw Pact are the most dominant military alliances, this article will focus on both of these alliances.
Chapter 1 (Alliance Doctrine), part 1 (The Foundation of Alliance Doctrine), point 1.5 on interoperability of NATO Standard AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine document published by NATO Standardization Office (NSO) in 2017 stating that “NATO doctrine, as a common language for operations, places great emphasis on interoperability. Accepted and applied doctrine is necessary for building effective coalitions. At an intellectual level, the doctrine allows commanders from different countries to apply a common approach to carrying out operations.”
Point 1.5 is supplemented by point 1.32, which reads, “The strength and leadership of NATO will always consist of various countries. This requires a high ability of interoperability and maximizes the use of capabilities, where there are several capabilities that some countries do not have.” The conclusion from the two points above is that NATO uses the doctrine of collective defense in which the focus and capabilities of each country determine its role in it.
Like NATO, the Warsaw Pact also has a doctrine based on collective defense. What distinguishes the collective defense of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, according to the National Council for Soviet and Eastern European Research document, is that the Warsaw Pact defines defense as a preemptive attack against a potential enemy using conventional weapons without eliminating the possibility of using nuclear weapons and is supported by a people’s war strategy that prioritizes large-scale mobilization. These two different doctrines inevitably affect the specifications of the doctrine holder’s military equipment.
NATO Tank Designs
Due to NATO’s defensive doctrine, the general description for main battle tank (MBT) specifications is to fight with another country’s units against an enemy in a larger number utilizing cover and concealment in a defensive war. Initially, due to technological limitations and countries’ capabilities, the tank design of NATO countries fell into two simple categories: excellent at defense but bad at offense and jack of all trades but master of none. The first category will put the country’s tank as the main defensive force, while the latter will put the tank in the support role. After some technological advancements in the 70s and the 80s, these two categories are supplemented by one additional category: excellent in defense and offense.
The main example of the first category — excellent at defense but bad at offense — is the UK’s Chieftain tank. Since the 1960s, due to its past experience in war against Germany, the UK Ministry of Defense emphasizes superior firepower and armor for its tank specifications at the expense of mobility. Additionally, Chieftain and the later Challenger 1 and Challenger 2 tank’s design has more armor in the turret than in the hull. One of the reasons that the British emphasize the armor on the turret than in the hull is to optimize the tank’s ability in a hull-down position — combined with its low speed compared to its counterparts, resulting in Chieftain’s great capability in a defensive role but limited capability in an offensive one. In order to support the slow-moving Chieftain in offensive and defensive missions, tanks that fell to the second category are needed.
French AMX-30, German Leopard I, and the Italian OF-40 are examples of NATO tanks that fell into the second category. Their main design emphasizes superior speed at the expense of armor. With limited to no armor, they could not act as the main defensive force with the Chieftains. In a defensive action, these tanks must stay mobile, utilizing their speed, and move from one defensive spot to another in order to avoid directly receiving shots from the enemy. Their speed also enables them to plug holes in the defensive line between the key defensive points in a short amount of time. Abilities that the Chieftain does not have. In an offensive action, they can support the Chieftains by flanking the enemy with their speed or move together with them, drawing enemy fire from them and avoiding it simultaneously with its superior speed, and let the Chieftains picks the enemy one by one.
The third category tanks are German Leopard 2, French Leclerc, and American Abrams. Due to technological advancements in the 70s, these countries could produce a tank that has superior armor, mobility, and firepower without any expense. This results in a tank that excels at offense and defense. Even though it excels at both, the main design still emphasizes the tank’s ability in a defensive role, such as high tank profile, great gun depression, and superior fire rate.
Warsaw Pact Tank Designs
The same as NATO, Warsaw Pact also has its tank design influenced by its doctrine of a preemptive strike. As Soviet-designed tanks dominated the arsenal of Warsaw Pact countries and also the result of the same industrial capabilities, the Pact does not have the same wide variety of tank designs as their NATO counterparts. Even so, the Soviet-designed tanks are more than enough to fulfill the role of each country.
Due to the Warsaw Pact doctrine of preemptive strike and mass mobilization, the design of the tank emphasizes the tank’s low and small profile, unergonomic interior, superior firepower, and superior armor. The unergonomic interior is needed for the tank to be more easily produced in the shortest amount of time possible. The short production time makes it suitable for mass mobilization doctrine. The tank’s low and small profile is needed for its lower detection rate when moving into attack position between terrains and a smaller target for the enemy. However, the tank’s low profile came at a cost: bad depression-elevation angle and also low fire rate. These factors can be seen in all of the Soviet-designed tanks, from the T-54 series until the late production T-72 and T-80 series.
Reference:
- Jones, Christopher (1979). “Soviet Military Doctrine and Warsaw Pact Exercise.” Harvard: National Council for Soviet and Eastern European Research.
- NATO Standardization Office (2017). “NATO Standard AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine Edition E Version 1.” Luxembourg: NATO Standardization Office (NSO).
