From the Asian Tiger into a Sleeping Tiger: The Downfall of the Indonesian Military in the Late 1960s
In the early 1960s, the Indonesian military was among the strongest in Asia. During that era, the military possessed state-of-the-art equipment that normally can only be seen during the 8th of May Parade in Moscow’s Red Square or the frontline of the Cold War in Europe. Having that kind of equipment is considered a luxury for any country, especially for a nonaligned country that gained independence two decades earlier. Indonesia was one of the only five countries to have strategic bombers in that era (others being the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Indonesia is also one of the only eight countries ever to have strategic bombers in its arsenal.
Using its strong military and political leverage, Indonesia managed to oust the Netherlands from West New Guinea and pressed India to back down during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. It also managed to tease Australia by infiltrating the country with jet bombers and submarines and forced the United Kingdom to store nuclear bombs in the region to retain its technical and strategic superiority during the Indonesia-Malaysian Confrontation. The following tables are the detail of Soviet-built state-of-the-art equipment (numbers may vary from different sources):
On the ground, the Army and Marine Corps have acquired a total of 175+ PT-76B amphibious tanks and 275 AMX-13/75 light tanks accompanied by 66 BTR-50P/PU and 200 AMX-13VCI/PDP armored personnel carriers. The Air Force also formed the Indonesian National Air Defence Force Command (Komando Pertahanan Udara Nasional, Kohudnas), equipped with S-75 Dvina (NATO reporting name: SA-2 Guideline) air defense systems. In the Vietnam War, U.S. aviators would find these systems terrifying due to their success in shooting down many U.S. aircraft early during the war.
Hundreds of other older technologies already in service with the military also support these latest technologies acquired by them, such as the infamous North American P-51D Mustangs and B-25J Mitchells, Douglas A-26B Invader, Alvis Saracen armored personnel carrier, Alvis Saladin armored fighting vehicle, and Soviet-built Pr.30K-class destroyers.
However, most of that military power was gone in just under a decade. Most of the equipment mentioned above, especially the aircraft, could not even fly and had to be grounded by the year 1970. So how can a country with the most powerful military in the southern part of the Equator lose the majority of its military power in just a couple of years? First, we need to know why and how the military acquired its state-of-the-art equipment.
Background
The much-proclaimed “golden era” of Soviet weaponry influx to Indonesia in the late 1950s and early 1960s came from the tattered Indonesian armed forces in the preceding years. While the countless infighting and rebellion gave the armed forces unrivaled experience in counter-guerrilla warfare, it left them badly-equipped and unsuitable for combating a peer adversary, let alone a superior one. The situation at that moment is not the ideal condition for Soekarno, given the increasingly deteriorating relationship between the inpatient Indonesian and the Dutch regarding the takeover of West New Guinea.
It was concluded that sooner or later, Indonesia would find itself in a conflict of interest against a particular country. It was an obvious idea to strengthen the armed forces to the core if Soekarno wants to go rough with his “Free and Active” diplomacy known as Politik Bebas Aktif in bahasa Indonesia. In the late 1950s, the Soviet Union was not the Great Power Indonesia initially sought. The Indonesian government representatives first contacted the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the arms deal before contacting the Soviet Union. One of the representatives, Air Force Major Ir. Kusudiarso Hadinoto, was sent personally by Soekarno to secure the deal for the procurement of MIM-3 Nike Ajax long-range surface-to-air missile systems. Indonesia, which still had economic difficulty due to its newly gained independence and multiple insurrections happening inside the country, also asked for a soft loan, including a 0% down payment of the deal from both countries.
Unfortunately, for Indonesia, according to the 1960 National Security Council Report of the U.S. Policy on Indonesia, the Presidential Determinations under the appropriate section of the Mutual Security Act of 1954 had amended that military programs for Indonesia not to exceed US$22 million in F.Y. 1959, US$20 million in F.Y. 1960, and US$20 million in F.Y. 1961. Furthermore, most of the funding had to be given to the Indonesian Army for small arms purchases. The U.S. assessed that the Army is the best service branch for maintaining stability and anti-Communist alertness in Indonesia. Moreover, during the deal, the representatives failed to convince the U.S. Congress and the U.K. Parliament on why they would need to help Indonesia in its fight against their NATO ally (the Netherlands).
These reasons lead to most of the arms deals not going through beyond the negotiating table. Indonesia was only able to secure a deal to procure ten C-130B Hercules tactical airlifter from the United States and 18 second-hand Fairey Gannet anti-submarine aircraft from the United Kingdom. The procurement of ten Hercules only became a deal due to U.S. intention to fix the relationship with Indonesia after one of its CIA pilots, Allen Pope, caught red-handed helping one of the rebel factions in its effort to topple the current Indonesian Government. Indonesia also has furnished the United States with written assurances that the newly acquired U.S.-furnished equipment must not be used against the Dutch-controlled West New Guinea. The condition caused enough dissatisfaction among Indonesian top government officials to turn their backs on the leading western nations and went for the Soviet Union.
Fortunately for the Indonesians, the Soviets offered them better terms, including the 0% down payment, which the Indonesian always wanted, an interest-free soft loan, and access to the newest technologies available in the Soviet Union. On another note, the U.S. military aid to Indonesia was severely limited also due to the uncertainty of Indonesia’s internal-external politics and pressures from the Netherlands and Australia. They voiced their concerns about Indonesia’s military build-up.
The arms deal with the Soviet Bloc began in 1957, but the major one was in 1958. In that year alone, Indonesia signed a massive deal of more than US$170 million, including jet fighters from Czechoslovakia and Poland. This deal somewhat showed the initial intermediary position of Eastern European countries before the Soviets directly joined the fray. It was done in such a scheme to avoid the western protests and opposition imposed on the countries which procured Soviet arms. The arms transfer was relatively fast. The MiG-15UTI “Midget”, a jet trainer, came in August 1958, followed by Il-28 “Beagle” bombers in October. In the same month, four submarine chasers of Project 122bis or Kronshtadt-class also made their way to the Republic, while the rest ten units were sent afterward.
Furthermore, through Premier Zhou Enlai, the Chinese offered the Indonesians to license-built the Shenyang J-5 (Chinese version of the Russian-designed MiG-17 “Fresco”) in Bandung. Still, the offer was quickly turned down by the director of the Indonesian Aerospace Corporation at the time, Air Marshal Nurtanio. Due to Indonesian economic difficulty, the reason that made the employee leave their job manufacturing aircraft to get in line for the distribution jugs of kerosene to keep their stove back home running.
In February 1959, the first MiG-17PF “Fresco-D” from Poland came (as Lim-5P). In September, the first two Whiskey-class submarines were inaugurated as KRI Tjakra (40) and KRI Nanggala (402). At least in March, around 8 Il-10 “Beast” prop trainers and Tu-2S “Bat” light bombers came from China. The arrival of the Soviet-built weapons was the outcome of the US$21 million credit deal of arms transfer in 1958, the biggest one after the deal with Czechoslovakia and Poland.
The year 1960 saw a significant development of Indonesia and Soviet relations, signified by Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to Indonesia. While the scope of the visit was broad, it was impossible not to talk about arms deals and aid. During this very visit, the continuation of the Indonesian Navy build-up was conceived. According to the Indonesian Navy intelligence chief in March, a cruiser, a submarine rescue vessel, and a naval base for the submarines (submarine pen) were planned for the following years. The naval arms deal was estimated to be around US$277 million.
The next significant arms deal was made in January 1961, had a worth of US$244 million, while another one was signed in June. The deal was very significant since Tu-16 “Badger” strategic bombers, MiG-21 “Fishbed” fighters, and S-75 Dvina (NATO reporting name: SA2 Guideline) surface-to-air missile systems were included in the deal. This deal also made Indonesia one of the only eight countries in the world ever to have a strategic bomber in its arsenal. Those deals were facilitated through a credit payment scheme amounting to more than US$400 million granted by the Soviets. In July, the two firsts Tu-16KS-1 “Badger-B” maritime-strike bombers of the total 14 landed at the Kemayoran AFB. These aircraft were equipped with Raduga KS-1 Komet (NATO reporting name: Kennel) air-to-surface missile that could hit a ship as far as 100 km away. By December, four Whiskey-class submarines joined the Navy after a voyage from the Russian Pacific Fleet base of Vladivostok.
Indonesian military build-up did not stop in 1962, as the equipment signed in the previous year only came in that year. The dreaded SA-2 Guideline SAM sites were ready in the latter half of 1962 and were divided into three batteries defending Jakarta. KRI Irian, a Project 68bis Sverdlov-class cruiser, and two Project 30bis Skoryy-class destroyers arrived in Surabaya in October that year, just right after Operation Trikora. In December, the last six Whiskey-class submarines finally came and were commissioned, procured through a quick arms deal in May. It was accompanied by a submarine tender ship of Project 233 Atrek-class.
In 1962, the infamous MiG-21F-13 “Fishbed-C” and MiG-19S “Farmer-C” were delivered, although the exact date was not published. The Indonesians themselves actually did not feel the need to buy the “Farmer,” but the Soviets insisted that if they want to buy the “Fishbed,” they need to buy the “Farmer” first or along with it. In November 1963, a further deal of US$52 million was approved by the Soviets, with the Navy having the largest share, followed by the Air Force and Army subsequently. The Air Force saw the addition of six An-12s, along with an unknown number of Mi-6s and Il-28s.
The year 1964 is the last year Indonesia made a deal with the Soviet Bloc. Of all deals and negotiations attempted by Indonesian authorities, around US$200 million were able to be materialized. However, they had to bargain tooth-and-nail as a result of multiple previous debt payment failures. Intriguingly, Indonesia was yet again trying to set a deal with Soviet Bloc countries, Czechoslovakia in particular. Czech’s L-29 Delfin, as de facto Warsaw Pact’s standardized trainer, won a deal of 18 units in June. All aircraft were delivered as of mid-1965, just a few months prior to the G30S tragedy. Another piece of equipment worth mentioning was P-30 “Khrustal” radar, a 2D E/F-band GCI, and an early warning radar, which also arrived in 1964. This powerful radar supplements the existing Nysa and Decca radar networks.
Complications Along the Way
While political turmoil of both internal and external factors were major contributors which led to the Indonesian Armed Forces’ downfall, economic and technical factors should never be ignored. Indonesia had repeatedly failed to pay its overdue military equipment debts, much to the Soviet’s dismay.
In 1961, due to a series of border conflicts and intractable ideological differences, the People’s Republic of China formally denounced the Soviet Union’s communism as the work of “revisionist traitors.” The PRC declared itself as the one true leader of the communist world. The denunciation caused the Sino-Soviet split and formally split the communist countries into two different blocs, one aligned with the PRC and the other with the USSR. Following the split in 1964, Soekarno, with the support and the agreement of the PKI, declared that Indonesia would align itself with the PRC through the creation of the Jakarta-Peking-Pyongyang axis. The move formally distanced Indonesia from the Soviet Union and made it hard for further arms deals, including spare parts.
The year 1963 saw the military shift its focus from West New Guinea to Malayan Peninsula and Northern Borneo. Operation Dwikora was carried out to annex the newly independent Malaysia and Singapore into Indonesia. The U.K. and its commonwealth allies strongly opposed the move. The British were terrified of the Indonesian military arsenal, so they deployed Avro Vulcan strategic bombers equipped with Red Beard nuclear bombs and a sizable military force to the region. Surprisingly, Operation Dwikora was also opposed by the Soviet Union. Overwhelmed by the conflict in Vietnam, the Soviets deemed that they could not afford to fund another “Vietnam.” Another thing that should be noted is that the line-of-communication between Soviet-Indonesia is much further and harder to cover than between Soviet-Vietnam, which has practically a safe zone near the Chinese border. Furthermore, they also did not want to get dragged into an unnecessary conflict with other NATO members, which in this case, Britain and its allies.
Indonesia started to show trouble with credit payment in 1963, where it was supposed to be the due date of the initial deals. Soviet tried to ease the debt burden by rescheduling the payment, which was postponed until at least 1969. Unfortunately, this was still too high of a price to pay since Indonesia was still in economic difficulty. As of 1965, Indonesia had only paid around $60 million of its total debt. The situation for Czechoslovakia was not any better, where Indonesia failed to pay the downpayment of a new deal and the repayment of 1958’s military aid. The repayment period was then extended to 1970, of course, with the adjusted interest.
In 1964, the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khruschev, declined a request from Indonesia to buy the equipment needed to equip frontline units for Dwikora. He informed the Indonesian General A.H. Nasution that he would not approve further military sales to Indonesia because of the obscurity of how the installments would be paid for the previous debt of US$2,5 billion. To make the matter worse, the long-sought request to establish weapons assembly plants in Indonesia was also rejected by the Soviets. At some point in 1964–65, the inflow of Soviet spare parts was gradually obstructed. All of these problems led to the decreased readiness of the Indonesian Armed Forces.
For example, not more than 20% of the total MiG-17 “Fresco” series aircraft were operational, 50% for the MiG-15UTI “Midget”, and 40% for the Il-28 “Beagle” series, according to CIA’s intel. The intel is in accordance with the statement of Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff Omar Dhani. He said that he was appointed to go to China to secure the potential replacement of the increasingly decaying Soviet-made aircraft in mid-1965. The condition is not surprising because Sino-Indonesian relations have become closer since 1963. The Chinese were eager to supply Indonesia with quite a lot of military equipment to the point that Soekarno believed that China would send him nuclear bombs, which was not the case.
The conditions worsened by the 30th of September 1965 PKI (also known as G30S/PKI) movement. The movement was a self-proclaimed organization of the Indonesian military members. With the support of PKI in the early hours of the 1st of October 1965, they assassinated six high-ranking Indonesian Army generals in an abortive coup d’etat. The assassination caused a huge backlash, and in the days and weeks that followed, the army, sociopolitical, and religious groups blamed the coup attempt on the PKI. The accusation caused a huge backlash that triggered a mass purge, resulting in the imprisonment and deaths of real or suspected PKI members and sympathizers. Even the Air Force Chief of Staff, Omar Dhani, is not safe and arrested after misunderstanding the movement and issuing a wrong statement. The cleansing of Communists in Indonesia by the Army caused the total termination of diplomatic relations — and hence, technical assistance — with the USSR.
In 1967, Soeharto replaced Soekarno as President. Soeharto, being a former Army general and an anti-Communist figure, made any relationship normalization with the Soviet Union impossible. The termination of Soviet spare parts supply and maintenance assistance led to the severe grounding and scrapping of Indonesian military equipment. An emergency dialogue was made in that year, but it was not in a good term, of course. Soviet agreed to provide spare parts worth US$10 million, but only on a cash basis and with no credit scheme. Indonesia only bought US$5 million of that amount and has never tried to procure more ever again since then. Yet, the colossal aid debt was only completely paid by Indonesia in 1999 through a generous 30-year term repayment.
On the technical side, the reliability problem also had something to do with the nature of Soviet aircraft design philosophy and manufacturing standards. In contrast to western aircraft, where the maintenance was to be done by a specialized and well-trained workforce, Soviet aircraft were designed to be maintained by conscripted soldiers/technicians. This thinking was rationalized with the premise of the Soviet’s limited ability to establish major maintenance depots at the front line in mind. As such, Soviet high command demanded their aircraft to be as simple and as rugged as possible.
All of the minor maintenance should be done in the front line. When the situation necessitated major maintenance, or the aircraft hits the “effective minimum lifespan”, the said aircraft must be sent to the rear depot or factory. For instance, a Soviet aircraft has 2,000 hours of lifespan. Then, the effective minimum lifespan of the aircraft was in terms of hours and said to be 1,000 hours. After flying for 1,000 hours, the aircraft must be sent to the rear depot and temporarily replaced by a fresh one. The supplement is then replaced by a new one after a while, and the cycle continues. Thus, the frontline fighters must be in high readiness and performance all of the time, but with two conditions.
To fully implement this Soviet doctrine, one’s air force has to accommodate an ample supply of spare parts and many spare aircraft to retain frontline combat strength. Or in other words, a firm and well-organized logistics of spare parts to the frontline. The demanding condition of the Soviet aircraft is the problem Indonesian Air Force faced due to the fact that doctrinal change requires some time to be firmly implemented. Inefficiency in military bureaucracy was to be expected, and lengthy, tedious paperwork caused a hard time for the technician in requesting the proper amount of spare parts to the frontline. The stockpile of parts was scattered all over the country, further exacerbating the problem. As if those weren’t enough, Soviet-made spare parts also have an unsatisfactory reputation within Indonesian ground crew ranks due to the poor quality control in manufacturing. On some occasions, they even have to manually grind or manipulate the spare parts to fit the aircraft. These logistical problems plagued both Soviet-made and Warsaw Pact-made aircraft.
For comparison, western aircraft — the United States specifically — don’t have to experience such procedures since the U.S. has sufficient airlift/sealift capability to bring heavy aircraft maintenance tools and has a huge, capable technician pool. Say an aircraft has 2,000 hours of lifespan. When the aircraft almost reaches the number, it must receive major maintenance to extend the lifespan (e.g., up to 4,000 hours), usually called SLEP (Service Life Extension Program). This maintenance scheme requires well-trained manpower and huge airlift/sealift capability to bring maintenance equipment and spare parts to the frontline and move them fast enough in the ever-changing frontline. It’s also not uncommon to employ civilian contractors to support the whole idea.
Aftermath
Indonesia has the most advanced military in Asia after the People’s Republic of China in the first half of the 1960s. However, Indonesia experienced a severe shortage of weapons in the decade preceding it. With the great aim of expelling the Dutch from West New Guinea, Indonesia rushed its military rearmament to fill the weapons shortage of the last decade.
Nevertheless, Indonesia lost most of its advanced equipment the following decade. Multiple factors are contributing to the loss. Faced with successive financial and political problems, added by the plague of the rushed equipment, Indonesia had trouble maintaining the available military hardware already in service. By the beginning of the 1970s, most of the Air Force aircraft had been grounded, and the Navy vessels were not fit to sail anymore. Without any viable choice, the Government decided to cut a deal with the United States and its allies following the establishment of better relations with them. A total of 13 MiG-21F-13 “FishbedC” aircraft were delivered to the U.S. in exchange for 12 Lockheed T-33 T-Bird trainer aircraft, 12 S-58T utility helicopters, and later, 16 F-5E/F Tiger II and 16 OV-10F Bronco aircraft.
The MiGs were added to the 4477th Test and Evaluation Squadron “Red Eagles”, a USAF aggressor squadron at Tonopah Test Range. The rest of the MiGs, whether it’s the “Midget”, “Fresco”, “Farmer”, or “Fishbed’’ are put on display at multiple museums, as gatekeepers, or as statues across Indonesia. There were other U.S.-made aircraft and naval vessels that were also donated to the military. In addition, Royal Australian Air Force and Tentera Udara Diraja Malaysia (Malaysian Air Force) donated a total of 18 CAC Sabre fighter jets to the Indonesian Air Force. Furthermore, the Pakistani Air Force took over the responsibility to train Indonesian pilots in the Sabre and several logistical aspects of the Indonesian Air Force in exchange for the sale of 5–6 of MiG-19S “Farmer-C” jets. As for the SA-2 Guideline SAM systems, there was an intriguing story. After a lengthy dialogue with the CIA, Indonesia agreed to transfer SNR-75 “Fan Song” radar and some fire control systems to the U.S. along with its technical documents around 1969–1970. Related personnel was also questioned intensively to gain priceless intel on the SAM system.
The fate of the Indonesian Navy’s largest ship has until now is also no better than the fighter jets nor the air defense missiles. The KRI Irian (201) was scrapped in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, in 1972 (other sources state Japan) after her condition deteriorated and she began to flood with seawater due to lack of maintenance. Another interesting note to take is when the CIA took some of the P-15 (NATO reporting name: Styx) anti-ship missiles to the U.S. in the same deal as the SA-2 Guideline systems transfer. Unexpectedly, Indonesia also agreed to do a P-15 live firing into a Project 30bis Skoryy-class destroyer as a target ship with remote U.S. monitoring. The telemetry data was monitored from an ELINT aircraft that didn’t fly over nor land in Indonesia for confidentiality reasons. Smaller vessels such as the Project 183R Komarclass were not in a better condition, as they were also decommissioned in the mid-1970s up to early 1980s along with several other types of Soviet ships. Of 104 ships bought from the Soviets, about half of these were already stricken from the list by 1976.
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