Behind the Bear’s Wrath: The reason behind Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
An overview of facts and analysis of events leading up to the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine.
This article is co-written by Djoko Bayu Murtie and Fauzi Nugraha.
The writers’ stance regarding the matter discussed in this article is described as follows:
- Russia has the right to defend its national interest and security.
- Ukraine also has the right to defend its sovereignty and to pursue its national interest.
Keywords: Russia-Ukraine Conflict, Euromaidan, Crimean Crisis, NATO’s Eastward Expansion
Thursday morning, February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. As the opening, Russia launched a total of 160 stand-off missiles consisting of ship-launched 3M14 Kalibr and air-launched Kh-101 “Kent” cruise missiles and ground-launch Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). Together with interdiction aircraft, the missiles hit multiple Ukrainian military facilities, such as airbase, military headquarters and base, ammunition depot, and the large concentration of Ukrainian forces, resulting in heavy damage. After the sun rose, the main invasion began as Russian troops started advancing on Ukrainian territory.
Nevertheless, the Ukrainian military put up a serious fight and even almost managed to repel a Russian air assault on an airport just northwest of Kyiv. The conflict can be seen as almost peer-to-peer conventional warfare between two countries. However, the war comes as a surprise to almost everybody globally, especially those who do not follow the geopolitical situation in Eastern Europe. So, what made Russia carry out a full-scale invasion of Ukraine?
Timeline
To understand what happened with Russia and Ukraine, we need to go back much further, even as far as 1989. In 1989, the communist governments of Warsaw Pact countries were toppled by their citizens, resulting in the rejection of communism all across Europe. The event concludes as the end of the Warsaw Pact as an organization to oppose NATO. However, the Soviet Union at that time did not take it easy. Accordingly, NATO and Soviet officials sit down together to discuss the matter. On January 31, 1990, German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher stated that “The changes in Eastern Europe and the German unification process must not lead to an impairment of Soviet security interests.” during talks with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. He also added that “NATO should rule out an expansion of its territory towards the East.” On February 9, 1990, during the discussion in Moscow with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, President Gorbachev stated that “We believe that NATO should not expand the sphere of its activity.” Up to 1993, statements and pledges from multiple NATO countries top officials, such as British Prime Minister John Major and his Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, French President Francois Mitterrand, and the then-new U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher.
However, while the West decided on the signing of treaties to formalize the agreements, the Soviets and then the Russians decided that statements and pledges were good enough to be considered formal. The behavior of Russian officials is then taken as an advantage by the West to achieve their own interests. Therefore, despite the statement and pledges, NATO did the opposite of what they said. Between 1999 and 2020, NATO integrated a total of 14 new countries into it. This really upset Russia because NATO managed to encircle the Russian territorial enclave of Kaliningrad and gained a foothold at Russia’s doorstep through the Baltic States. This is why Russia has lost confidence with the West, and its the reason why they called NATO eastward expansion “broken promises.” This also caused a deep feeling of mistrust in the Russian people with the West. In Russians’ eyes, the West has cheated Russia and took advantage of their weak period in the 1990s to expand eastward without any opposition from Russia.
Nevertheless, Ukraine also has its part in ruining its relationship with Russia by forming closer ties with the West. Ukraine is actually the first Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS–a Russian-led ASEAN-like coalition) country to enter NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Things got escalated in 2008. Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, a discerning advocate of Ukraine’s NATO membership, along with her cabinet, proposed the entrance of Ukraine into NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP) in January. Following this, rather than reminding the Ukrainian government of Ukraine’s current neutrality stance, NATO instead antagonized Moscow when its acting Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer announced that Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become members. Ukraine was then subsequently admitted into NATO’s MAP.
A heated discourse of opposing arguments was sparked by the opposition parties, with them stressing the necessity of holding a national referendum before deciding on a significant geopolitics move. In April, NATO held a summit in Bucharest. After strong opposition from Germany and France, the alliance ditched the idea of offering MAP for Ukraine for the time being, underlining the concerns of geopolitical balance. The decision pleased Russia whom President Vladimir Putin led at that time.
Fast forward to Ukraine, early 2010. Viktor Yanukovich emerged as the President of Ukraine after a tight competition with Yulia Tymoshenko. As opposed to Tymoshenko, who is western-oriented, Yanukovich is a Russian supporter, even sometimes considered as a puppet of Vladimir Putin himself. In 2012, the E.U. and the Ukrainian government initiated talks on Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement in order to bring Ukraine out of Russia’s sphere of influence and act as the first step to bring Ukraine’s economy into the standard of Western Europe. The decision very much made Russia unhappy, and under pressure from Moscow, Yanukovich decided to pull back from the agreement and suspend it. Yanukovich then proposed a move that would make Ukraine closer to Russia. He began talks to get Ukraine involved in Eurasian Economic Agreement, an economic agreement that involved all ex-Soviet states except Georgia. The decision was met with dissatisfaction from Ukrainian citizens because they feel that the E.U.’s economic boom could help and influence them more than the Russian-centered economy, as evident in ex-Warsaw Pact countries like Poland and the Baltic States.
On November 21, 2013, a large demonstration was held at Euromaidan (Maidan Nezalezhnosti–Independence Square) in downtown Kyiv to oppose Yanukovich’s policy. After a few days, the scope of the protest widened into calling the resignation of President Yanukovich and the Second Azarov Cabinet. Ideas and opinions such as “widespread government corruption,” “abuse of power,” and “violation of human rights” fueled the protest. The protest also spread to locations outside Kyiv and was considered a nationwide protest. On November 30, the protest dispersal efforts turned sideways and became violent. Security forces clashed with protesters, injuring dozens of protesters and security forces. The security forces, led by Berkut Special Police Unit, then raided other locations harboring the fleeing protesters and beat them up in the process. The incident caused more Ukrainian citizens to join the protest.
The protest then led to the 2014 Ukrainian Coup, also called Maidan Revolution. The coup deposed Viktor Yanukovich from his office and overthrew the Second Azarov Cabinet. Yanukovich then fled to Moscow and requested Russia’s assistance. Russian Federation then declared that the coup that overthrew Yanukovich from office is illegal and did not recognize the replacing government. This sparked multiple counter-protest in the Russian-populated regions of Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Most of the population in the region sees that Yanukovich is the legitimate leader who was chosen from a legitimate election. Ukraine’s new government decided to ditch the Eurasian Economic Agreement despite Russia’s protest and signed the Ukrainian-European Union Association Agreement. Ukraine also decides that it wants to pursue the goal of becoming one of NATO’s members.
The situation was escalated to its highest degree in March 2014. Dissatisfied with Ukrainian government policy, Russia took advantage of the chaos and counter-protests in multiple Ukraine regions. On February 27, 2014, Russian troops without insignia started to move from their bases in the loaned-Sevastopol Naval Base and occupy multiple strategic locations in Crimea. Russia also managed to install a pro-Russian government in Crimea. The pro-Russian government there held a referendum to consolidate Russia’s position in Crimea. The referendum asked local populations whether they wanted to join Russia as a federal subject or if they wanted to restore the 1992 Crimean Constitution and Crimea’s status as a part of Ukraine. The result is obvious, 97 percent vote for integration of the region into the Russian Federation. A similar referendum was held in the Russian-populated area of Donetsk Oblast and Luhansk Oblast. It resulted in the formation of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR/DNR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR/LNR). Other pro-Russian uprisings were held in Ukraine’s second-largest city, Kharkiv, and the large seaport city of Odessa, but failed. The United Nations General Assembly also rejected the referendum and annexation, adopting a resolution affirming the “territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.”
Despite the disastrous event orchestrated by Russia, the interim Ukrainian government decided to hold an election, and Petro Poroshenko became Ukraine’s next president after winning in a landslide. The new government also initiated a large-scale purging of government officials that are associated with the overthrown government. Ukraine also brands the DPR and LPR as rebels and then terrorist organizations. It sparked a war between Ukraine and the two breakaway republics. Unable to see the pro-Russian rebels lose, Russia supplied the rebels with a large amount of military equipment, even the brand new T-72B3 obr. 2013g tanks.
Efforts were made to stop the war in the region. A series of peace talks between Russia (which represents the two breakaway republics) and Ukraine was held in Minsk, Belarus, with mediation from Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE–represented by France and Germany). The talks and negotiation resulted in the signing of the Minsk Agreement, which sought an end to the war in Eastern Ukraine. However, just like previous ceasefire agreements, the Minsk Agreement was never fully implemented. Firefight and artillery duels kept on happening in the region, although there was no more large-scale offensive seen in the region. Both sides also decided to fortify their positions with trenches, and the fighting from this point on became static trench warfare. However, after the agreement, the situation in Ukraine deescalated quickly.
However, during this period, Poroshenko and his government increased their effort in pursuing the goal of making Ukraine closer to the West and becoming a member of NATO. After this point, the tension starts to escalate slowly but at a steady rate. On December 23 2014, Kyiv officially renounced its non-aligned status. In 2015, Ukraine took part in five military joint-exercises and partnership programs with the U.S. and other NATO members. On June 8 2017, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a law that oversees Ukraine’s integration with NATO as Ukraine’s number one foreign policy priority. On March 10, 2018, Ukraine was admitted into NATO’s Aspiring Members list. On May 19 of the same year, Poroshenko signed a decree that formally ended Ukraine’s participation as a member of the CIS, further distancing Kyiv from Moscow’s influence. During this time, Ukraine also started to receive a large number of influx foreign military instructors that train Ukraine’s standing military, National Guards, and local militias to fight the rebels and ultimately the Russians (if they decided to invade). The West also sends military equipment to Ukraine, such as armored vehicles, bulletproof vests, helmets, assault rifles, ammunition, night-vision goggles, and radars.
Despite Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the DPR-LPR’s denial of about 12% of Ukraine’s eligible population, Ukraine went forward with its 2019 presidential election. This election saw the entrance and dramatic victory of a newcomer in Ukrainian high politics, Volodymyr Zelensky. He was a prominent and successful comedian in Ukrainian society won 73.2% of the votes in the second round of the election with his populism and self-proclaimed anti-establishment agenda. His initial move was to compromise with Russia by legitimizing election in DPR-LPR in exchange for clandestine Russian forces withdrawal in October 2019, by the Steinmeier Formula Agreement. This advance met harsh criticism and opposition by Ukrainian nationalists, but Zelensky insisted on keeping the agreement to reduce the tension and solve the issue peacefully.
Zelensky’s willingness to compromise with Russia annoyed many western-aligned Ukrainian nationalists in power. Security professionals saw him as a soft figure and demanded more assertive notions to be stated in the upcoming national stance. After a protracted delay, he caved in due to criticism and approved the most recent National Security Strategy in September 2020, which specified the ultimate goal of Ukrainian NATO membership. Previously on June 12 2020, Ukraine joined NATO’s Enhanced Opportunity Partner. Both of these bold actions undoubtedly drew Russia’s ire. It showed that as reluctant as Zelensky was to stir the tension with Russia, he would still choose the vision of applying for NATO Membership Action Plan and European Union membership over conceding to Russia’s demand of Ukraine’s neutrality.
The bell of escalation rang yet again in late March 2021. Following Zelensky’s approval of the de-occupation and reintegration strategy for Crimea, Russia deployed a significant contingent of its armed forces from other military districts to Crimea and Voronezh Oblast. It was the most significant troop movement since the Crimea takeover in 2014. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Ruslan Khomchak estimated around 28 Russian battalion tactical groups (BTGs) along the border, with 25 more en route. Russia later confirmed that over 50 BTGs or 15,000 troops were deployed to the region as a part of massive drills. In late April, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu announced that Russian forces would return to their original bases on May 1. Ukraine’s reaction to this unprecedented mobilization was harsher condemnation and the bolder announcement of its ambition to join NATO. On the other hand, Moscow did not appear to be eager to back down.
In September 2021, up to 200,000 Russian troops were involved in “Zapad 2021”, a joint Russia-Belarussian military exercise. This exercise featured a scenario of the NATO coalition intervening in Belarus’ regime change, expanded into a conventional war with Belarussia and Russia. In the worst-case conflict scenario, the exercise demonstrated Russia’s military readiness and interoperability with Belarussian forces. Despite the conclusion of the joint exercise, Russia continued to post up to 100,000 troops near the Ukraine-Russia border by November 2021.
Putin reiterated his concerns of NATO’s long-range missile threat for Russia once again in December, not long after Zelensky claimed that Russia was supporting a plot to depose him. Putin stated that if NATO decided to strike Moscow with cruise and hypersonic missiles, he claimed Russia would only have 5–10 minutes to respond. The U.S. repeatedly warned the E.U. and Ukraine of an impending Russian invasion in January 2022 and declared their support for Ukraine. Furthermore, a significant amount of armaments, especially anti-tank weapons, were transferred from NATO countries to Ukraine. From the 10th through the 20th of February, Russia and Belarus conducted another joint exercise dubbed “Allied Resolve 2022”, with intermittent artillery firing keeping tensions high while simultaneously continuing force build-up on the border with Ukraine. On February 23, Zelensky announced a state of emergency. The next day, Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine.
The situation is a national interest and security threat for Russia
From 1992–2003, Russia actually wanted to join NATO and persuade Western Countries to accept Russia as a member of the organization without having to go through the lengthy process of “Partner Programs.” The request that the NATO officials reject outright. One of the reasons Russia wants to pursue this goal is to prevent Russia from being isolated from the rest of Europe. In a BBC interview with David Frost, Vladimir Putin said, “Russia is part of the European culture. And I cannot imagine my own country in isolation from Europe and what we often call the civilized world”. Yet, Russia’s goal to join NATO was abandoned due to the increased suspicion of Russian and Belarusian governments to the West about the 2004 Orange Revolution of Ukraine. They believed NATO countries were the ones responsible for it. From that point on, the Russian government believed that NATO existed after the Soviet Union’s fall to counter Russia and see Russia as a threat. According to their logic, NATO existed in the past to counter the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and now after the fall of both the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO still exists, which could only mean one thing.
From the Kremlin’s point of view, NATO’s eastward expansion is seen as an attempt at surrounding and neutralizing Russia. Each Eastern European country they incorporate brings them closer to the Russian capital of Moscow. The nearest NATO troops to Moscow are stationed in the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). If those troops were positioned along Latvia’s border with Russia, they would find themselves positioned 620 km away from Moscow. This situation will worsen if Ukraine is admitted into NATO. NATO troops would be only 450 km away from Moscow.
Keep in mind that if a country with a border with or located close to Russia is admitted into NATO, a coalition of troops from other NATO members will be stationed in that said country under the NATO eFP (enhanced Forward Presence) program. NATO would also station foreign fighter jets in the country under the program called NATO Air Policing. These same jets would also often be seen intercepting Russian military aircraft or an aircraft carrying top Russian officials operating/flying close to the border of NATO countries, the Baltic Sea, or the Black Sea. Missiles stationed in those countries would have a very short flight time reaching Moscow, and Russian argued that they would only have a 5–10 minutes window to react.
A coalition of troops from multiple countries stationed on their doorstep would be perceived as a security threat by any country on earth. Russia is no exception. From the Russian point of view, these troops will not be there without purpose, and their purpose is no other than to protect the country they are in from Russia. This meant that these troops viewed Russia as a threat, and Russia, like any other country on earth, would consider anyone with that view as hostile. It caused an endless cycle of seeing each other as “hostile.” Additionally, Russia sees NATO eFP as an excuse or pretext for U.S. military deployment close to their border.
Furthermore, Belarus and Ukraine currently pose as a buffer state between Russia and NATO countries. They can also be called Russia’s “iron curtain” (in reference to the iron curtain of the Soviet Union). This buffer state would mean that in the event of war between Russia and NATO, Russia would not have to wage war on its territory. Any NATO troops advancing from Western Europe to Russia must go through these countries first before making contact with Russian territory. Practically, in the event of war, these countries would keep Russian territory away from harm and destruction. Moreover, the presence of the buffer countries would mean that Russia does not have to station a large number of troops on its border to balance the presence of NATO eFP. It is also important to note that Ukraine shares a stunning 1,975 kilometers border with Russia. For Russia, deploying troops to secure a border that long would mean bankruptcy.
Ukraine’s integration into E.U. economic policy would also mean that Russia would lose its influence over a country with close ties from historical, ethnic, and geographical perspectives. Losing a country with such ties would make Moscow perceived as weak in international relations and fear of losing its dignity over the countries that have looked up to them made this even worse.
Moreover, the integration would also mean that Western corporations would be free to start businesses in Ukraine. They would also take advantage of Ukraine’s large amount of untouched gas deposits. The extraction of Ukraine’s gas would make Western countries (especially Germany) independent from Russia’s oil trade or at least reduce the amount they imported from Russia. As we all know, gas is one of the largest export of Russia, and 77% of the total Russian gas export went to European countries through the Nordstream gas pipeline. Therefore, the presence of Ukrainian gas in the European market would give a terrible blow to Russia’s economy. In a best-case scenario, Russia would lose a large amount of its income from exports in the energy sector. In contrast, the blow will also ultimately repeat an event similar to the 1986 Oil Glut in a worst-case scenario. In 1985, Saudi Minister for Oil Ahmed Yamani stated that his country was leaving the agreement on limiting oil production and starting to increase its production on the oil market. Saudi Arabia then began to produce oil at full capacity, thus creating a large amount of oil surplus. It caused the oil price to drop 6.1 times the normal price at that time and made some countries independent from Soviet oil (which is one of the Soviet Union’s main export products). This would lead to the decline of the Soviet’s economic growth and ultimately serve as one of the reasons for the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Another reason that made Russia believe that Ukraine is a threat to its national interest is Ukraine’s decision to greatly limit the North Crimean Canal flow that supplies water to the Russian-controlled Crimean Peninsula. The blocking of the flow dries out the region. In addition, the Crimean agricultural industry, which depends on water from the canal, experienced a massive shrinkage from 130,000 hectares of fertile land in 2013 to only 14,000 hectares in 2017. Worse, the water blockage means that Crimeans only have 3 to 5 hours of water access per day, which is lower than Africans who have average water access of 7 hours per day.
Lastly, the final straw for Russia is the intention of the Ukrainian government that is trying to restore Ukraine’s nuclear weapons. Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine suddenly has 3,000 nuclear weapons in its possession. The weapons belonged to the Soviet Union units who were stationed in the territory of Ukrainian SSR during the Cold War and passed down to the Ukrainian Armed Forces shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1994, the representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States signed the memorandum on the accession of Ukraine into the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state member. The memorandum is called the Budapest Memorandum and resulted in the disarmament of all Ukrainian nuclear weapons. In turn, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States will guarantee the security and the sovereignty of Ukraine. At the height of the 2014 Crimean Crisis and the instigation of war in the Donbass Region, Ukrainian politicians from Svoboda, Radical Party of Oleh Liashko, and the National Corps Political Parties have called for Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and reconsideration of its non-nuclear status. The idea was renewed on April 15, 2021, when the Ukrainian Ambassador to Germany, Andriy Melnyk, told Deutschlandfunk radio that if Ukraine is not allowed to become a NATO member, his country might have to reconsider its status as a non-nuclear-weapon state to guarantee its defense. Lastly, in 2022, President Zelensky renewed the sentiments during his speech at the Munich Security Conference on February 19. He mentioned that the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 and the Ukrainian non-nuclear status were “in doubt.”
The Russian government considers the remarks made by Ukrainian politicians very seriously. President Putin himself stated that Ukraine possesses nuclear weapon technologies and its delivery systems (ballistic missiles and aircraft) inherited from the Soviet Union. He also stated that with foreign support, “it is only a matter of time before Ukraine creates nuclear weapons”. Indeed, in the past, Ukraine had an industrial complex that could create nuclear warheads during Soviet times. It also has the Pivdenmash, which was the largest missile factory on earth, and Antonov Design Bureau, which could design large aircraft. However, the Pivdenmash–now called Yuzhmash–has reoriented its missile building towards space projects, and the Antonov Design Bureau has reoriented towards commercial cargo aircraft. In addition to the Putin statement, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that “Ukraine started dangerous games related to plans to acquire their own nuclear weapons.” Some experts said that it sealed the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Why would Russia invade Crimea and orchestrate the two breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk?
The main reason Russia invaded Crimea was to secure the Sevastopol Naval Base. Sevastopol Naval Base is the largest and most strategically placed naval base in the Black Sea. A large naval force based on the location would easily control the naval supremacy on the Black Sea. The naval base itself has been loaned to Russia by Ukraine from 1997 in accordance with the Russia-Ukraine Partition Treaty of 1997. If Ukraine had joined NATO, Ukraine would have cut the loan period short of removing the Russian military presence from its own soil. In turn, the empty slot at Sevastopol would be utilized by NATO since the Ukrainian Navy size is very small to use the base’s maximum potential on its own. The naval base most likely would be used as a staging/resupply port or the main base for NATO naval operation in the Black Sea. Losing the largest naval base in the region to NATO and having another NATO base of operation very close to the border is not an option for Russia.
Moreover, the Russian annexation of Crimea would make it harder for Ukraine to be accepted into NATO. The annexation means that Ukraine itself has a territorial dispute with Russia. In a case where Ukraine is a member of NATO, according to Article 5 of NATO’s constitution, “an attack against one ally is considered an attack against all allies,” the territorial dispute would place NATO in a direct conflict with Russia. In short, the Crimean territorial dispute would be one of the considerations that made NATO think twice before deciding to accept Ukraine’s application for membership.
The orchestration of two breakaway republics in the Ukraine Eastern Region also has its own purpose. In a worst-case scenario where Ukraine is accepted to be a member of NATO, the regions would serve as a buffer region so that Russia would not have to station a large number of troops on the entire 1,974 km-long land border with Ukraine. While not in a worst-case scenario, the regions would tie a large amount of Ukrainian military force and divert a large number of funds to the Ukrainian war effort, whereas in the case without the breakaway regions, the fund would be used to modernize the Ukrainian military equipment. The regions also act as a reminder to the world that not all Ukrainians agree with the decision to join the E.U. and NATO. Furthermore, if two breakaway regions are acknowledged by Russia and call Russia for help, they would serve as a perfect casus belli to legitimate a Russian invasion of Ukraine.
What is the reason for Russia to invade Ukraine on March of 2022? Is the timing right?
Ukraine has begun receiving a steady flow of military aid from NATO countries, especially the United States, since the 2014 Crimean Crisis and the War in Donbass. Other than military equipment, the aid also provides Ukrainian military access to NATO-standard training. These military aids gave the Ukrainian military much-needed modernization and capabilities to be able to at least fight back the Russian military in case of an invasion. The training also made the Ukrainian military to be more professional and competent than before. During the heightened tension with Russia in the period of 2021–2022, Ukraine received a much larger influx of military aid from NATO countries in the form of thousands of anti-tank guided missile systems (ATGM) and man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS). The sudden increase in military equipment flow to Ukraine further strengthened its military. Russia in Ukraine adopted Teddy Roosevelt’s “Big Stick Policy,” which is based on the West African proverb, “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far.” It is essentially a nation’s foreign policy that would use a serious military capability or superiority to force its adversary to give more attention to its demands during diplomatic talks, which in part ties to the idea of Realpolitik. Obviously, strengthening the Ukrainian military would not make it easy for Russia to apply the “Big Stick Policy” to Ukraine. In short, the stronger the Ukrainian military is, the harder for Russia to strong-arm Ukraine in the diplomatic talks. Furthermore, the stronger Ukrainian military would make it harder for the Russians to “tame” the country in case of an invasion. It clearly can not be kept ongoing.
In late September of 2021, Russia and Belarus carried out a large-scale military exercise called the Zapad-21. The Zapad (West) military exercise is a recurring military exercise of every four years focusing on the scenario of a coalition of NATO states intervening in Belarus to conduct regime change and expanding into a regional war with strikes against Belarus and Russia. Zapad-21 involved as many as 200,000 soldiers from Russia and Belarus. It is also larger than the previous Zapad exercises. In addition, Russia’s Northern Fleet Command also held a large-scale naval maneuver in the Arctic Sea during the same time. The exercise serves as a prominent display of military capabilities and willingness to employ them. Russia also hoped that it would influence the following negotiations gaining favorable agreement in the following negotiations with Ukraine and the West. Lastly, it serves to “read” Ukrainian response against the military show-off force. In short, Zapad-21 mostly serves as the “Big Stick” in Russia’s “Big Stick Policy” against Ukraine of 2021. Unfortunately, the results of the following negotiations disappoint Russia, and Ukraine does not seem to be deterred by the “Big Stick” held by Russia. On the contrary, Ukrainian National Guard even held an exercise (although in a much smaller scale) near the Ukraine-Belarus border to show Ukraine’s determination. Therefore, Russia concludes that it could not influence the decision-making in Ukraine anymore in the near future. The Russian “Big Stick Policy” on Ukraine has failed.
In response to this, President Putin stated that “it is only a matter of time before Ukraine is admitted to NATO, and becomes the launching pad for potential attacks on Russia.” He also added, “We clearly understand that given this scenario, the level of military threats to Russia will increase dramatically, several times over.” He also emphasized that “at this point, the risk of the sudden strike at our country will multiply.” In conclusion, for Russia to fully prevent Ukraine from joining NATO and stop NATO’s eastward expansion, the only choice is to take it over or have it ruled by a “friendly” government. Additionally, The action must be taken immediately and can not be delayed any further.
