Aircraft Maintenance Perspective: West vs East
Exploring how the differences impact operational readiness and maintenance policy.
It is a common knowledge that Russian aircraft have a lower mean time between maintenance than their Western counterparts, which means that Russian aircraft have to undergo maintenance more frequently than their Western counterparts. This has proved troublesome for Russian aircraft operators outside Russia because they now have only limited options to maintain their aircraft due to the CAATSA imposed on Russia. As a result, most of their Russian aircraft fleet now has lower operational readiness. Some have pointed out that the problem exists due to the poor engineering quality of the Russian manufacturers. The “problem,” if one views it comparatively between Russian and Western aircraft, actually stems from the days of the Cold War. This is because most of the current operational fourth-generation aircraft are either designed or produced during the Cold War or are even an improved version of their Cold War airframe. One thing that most people miss is that each country has its own operational conditions dictated by the circumstances faced by the country at the time, such as geographical, manpower, doctrine, and resource limitations. This would then be translated by the aircraft designers into a design philosophy of an aircraft.
Case in point, Russian (then-still Soviet) and Western aircraft were designed with different goals and circumstances in mind, thus different design philosophies. One must also keep in mind that the job to maintain an aircraft is labor-intensive and can drain the necessary manpower from a country’s military. For example, the US Air Force Thunderbird requires at least 18 personnel to maintain a single F-16. Meanwhile, other combat squadrons require an average of 20 to 25 personnel to maintain a single F-16 in combat conditions.
Western Perspective
The West, where most of their armed forces are constrained by their limited manpower, opted to produce aircraft that have a longer mean time between maintenance to mitigate the high number of aircraft that require maintenance at one time and also to maintain high aircraft operational readiness per squadron to maintain aerial presence on the battlefield. Because of the limited available personnel, it also means that they need to enhance the capability of a single aircraft to compensate for the low numbers. All of this translates to a higher aircraft procurement cost but lower maintenance cost per period. This lower maintenance cost per period actually comes down to the low number of maintenance operations that Western aircraft require. On the other hand, the price of each component replacement required for maintenance is relative to the complexity of the part itself and its availability, just like other goods circulating on the market.
Eastern Perspective
The Russians/Soviets, on the other hand, do not appear to be affected by the manpower constraint experienced by most of the Western armed forces. This is partly due to their relatively large population compared to other European countries and the presence of their conscription. While conscription provides the armed forces with a large pool of manpower, it also reduces the quality of individual personnel, especially the personnel required to maintain highly technological weapon systems like combat aircraft. As in the nature of conscription, the low quality of individual personnel’s skills is due to the limited and fast training period for each individual. This, in turn, affects the design and maintenance philosophy of Russian/Soviet aircraft, which emphasizes a few things:
Frequent Preventative Maintenance
Russian/Soviet aircraft, as stated before, require more frequent checking, lubrication, and adjustment than their Western counterparts with similar missions and roles. This is due to several reasons: poor initial manufacturing quality control, a medium for training of the conscripts, and a conservative maintenance schedule.
To address the new threats posed by newer aircraft of Western militaries and to cover the large border of Russia, Soviet/Russian officials are usually quick to press new aircraft into mass production and service only several years after their initial flight if the initial flight performance proves satisfactory. This poses problems for the quality of the initial batch of aircraft. This is also worsened by quality control problems during the manufacturing process and the preference of Russian industry to use manual and mechanical rather than automated and solid-state manufacturing. However, the initial quality problem usually diminishes quickly as the manufacturer discovers defects from their own observations or reports from frontline units, and the quality of individual parts improves.
Other than manufacturing defects due to quality control, the frequent maintenance of Russian aircraft is actually there by design. Due to the limited and fast training of conscripts, as mentioned earlier, it is important for ground crews to have more training when they are assigned to their respective units to be reliable. Thus, the frequent maintenance of Russian aircraft serves as a tool for familiarization and training for the large body of conscript ground crews.
The Russians also place very serious concern about premature component failures. To mitigate this, the Russians set up a very conservative schedule. The schedule results in the elimination of uncertainty in scheduling, simplification of the maintenance procedure, and helps to minimize unanticipated downtime due to premature failure. This doesn’t mean, however, that Russian aircraft don’t experience premature failure. They still experience premature failure, but at a lower rate than Western aircraft.
Replacement of Parts Over Repair
Due to the lower quality of ground crews available to the Russian Air Force, the standard operational procedure for squadron-level ground crew organization states a preference for replacing parts rather than repairing them. If any repairs are necessary, they would be conducted at least at the regimental level or above, as they require technical skills possessed only by ground crews at those higher levels. This preference also facilitates ease of maintenance and meets the long-term maintenance requirements.
Specialization: Specific Place for Specific Types of Maintenance by Specific Personnel
The nature of Soviet maintenance policy places great stress on the specialization of certain maintenance tasks, which narrowly focuses the technical proficiency of maintenance personnel. Consequently, maintenance personnel are organized into units based on their tasks, becoming masters of their respective jobs. The rigidity of the maintenance policy also means that aircraft designers write the aircraft maintenance manual in minute detail, dictating to maintenance personnel what, when, and how maintenance must be done, leaving minimal or no room for individual judgment on whether components should be replaced or repaired. Once an aircraft undergoes periodic maintenance, complex components are immediately dismounted and sent to their respective maintenance locations, such as repair plants for repair or factories for overhaul and rebuilding. The rigidity of the system, established by the Soviets and still followed by the Russians, means that certain maintenance can only be done at specific places by specific personnel, whereas Western aircraft maintenance and overhaul can mostly be performed in the field without the need to send them back to the factory. This rigid system involves large movements of parts and personnel, which would prove too difficult and taxing for Russian aircraft operators outside Russia. However, the system is primarily in place to facilitate easier training for conscripts and for them to learn to do complex jobs rather than multiple complex jobs.
Russian maintenance organization is divided as follows: team inspection branch, flight technical branch, squadron technical branch (TECh), air technical battalion (Obato), and overhaul plants. The team inspection branch is the lowest maintenance organization in the Russian Air Force, operating at the flight level (typically consisting of 4 aircraft) and responsible only for preflight and postflight checks. The flight technical branch operates at the squadron level, with personnel responsible for minor aircraft repairs and inspections. These personnel are usually divided and organized based on their specialties, such as engines, armament, safety equipment, electrical equipment, and avionics, each with their own separate shops. TECh, operating at a higher level (air regiment level), is responsible for major aircraft repairs, with personnel also divided based on their specialties, similar to the flight technical branch. Usually, TECh maintenance workshop locations differ from those of the lower organizations and are located far behind the frontline, necessitating the movement of aircraft in need of maintenance. If an aircraft cannot be moved to the location, TECh has an organized mobile maintenance group called PARM that can move locations from squadron to squadron using ground vehicles. Air technical battalions or Obato are organizations responsible for operating military airfields and providing the residing squadrons with necessary logistics. Overhaul plants are factories under the control of the Russian Ministry of Defense responsible for overhauling military aircraft. They are manned by civilian personnel but governed by military personnel. These factories differ from those run by aircraft design bureaus, which are responsible for aircraft production and rebuilding.
Due to the lengthy maintenance schedule and time, during overhaul or rebuilding, frontline aircraft are sent to factories or aircraft plants, and the empty positions left by the aircraft are filled by new aircraft, usually ones with newer upgraded features pulled from stockpiles, storage, or newly built ones. The aircraft that undergo the required overhaul or rebuilding receive newer upgrades and are stored in storage or stockpiles, sent to frontline units if another aircraft requires overhaul or rebuilding to fill the void. The cycle then continues.
For overseas operators of Russian aircraft, this means that major repairs (only for those operating a handful of Russian aircraft), overhauls, and rebuilds of aircraft must be done in Russia, and the aircraft must be sent there to undergo specific maintenance (unless the operator also have the agreement with Russia to establish major maintenance facilities in their own country, which is not common). Because overseas operators usually only operate a limited number of Russian aircraft without stockpiles, overhauls or rebuilds result in lower fleet readiness and quantity.
The rear location of repair and overhaul also benefits from low vulnerability. Thus, advanced repair and rebuilding can be done with minimal disturbances caused by enemy actions.
Different Maintenance Classification and Schedule for Airframe, Avionics, and Engine
Russian designers differentiate the maintenance regime for the aircraft’s airframe, avionics, and engine mainly due to one factor: differing service life and overhaul frequencies. This discrepancy arises from variations in the quality of engines provided by engine manufacturers. Aircraft designers consider an engine to have a service life of 20–25% that of an airframe. Russian airframes typically undergo five major overhauls throughout their service life, whereas engines typically undergo only two to three overhauls. Consequently, each aircraft may require five or more different sets of engines during its entire service life. This, compared to Western aircraft, is what contributes to the higher maintenance costs of Russian-built aircraft. Russians also use discrete sub-schedules for major components such as the electrical system and radar. Because these three components have different maintenance schedules, the aircraft must undergo more downtime when each component requires maintenance.
Business Model
The maintenance policy mentioned above has led the Russian aircraft manufacturer to adopt a different business model than their western counterparts. Due to the specialization of the Russian maintenance policy, which dictates that complex components must be removed from the aircraft and sent to specific places for maintenance or rebuilding, Russian aircraft component spare parts are grouped into assemblies or sub-assemblies and are only readily available for purchase on the market in that assembly or sub-assembly state, as opposed to individual parts available on the Western aircraft spare parts market. While this type of business model has proven advantageous to the manufacturer, it has proved to be too troublesome and more expensive for aircraft operators outside Russia itself. This is because, in order to perform minor maintenance where a part must be replaced, the operator must purchase the entire assembly or sub-assembly where the part that needs replacing is located, instead of individual parts that require replacing.
Conclusion
The maintenance practices of Russian aircraft present significant challenges and differences compared to their Western counterparts. These disparities stem from historical, geopolitical, and operational factors that have shaped the design philosophies and maintenance policies of each respective aviation tradition. While Western aircraft prioritize longer mean time between maintenance to enhance operational readiness and mitigate manpower constraints, Russian/Soviet aircraft require more frequent maintenance due to various factors including quality control issues, training methodologies, and component service life disparities. This results in a maintenance system characterized by specialization, rigidity, and reliance on assembly-based spare part procurement. While this model may benefit the manufacturer, it imposes logistical and financial burdens on operators outside Russia. Overall, understanding these differences is crucial for both military strategists and aviation industry stakeholders navigating the complexities of international defense procurement and operational readiness.
References
Drane, & Leslie, R. F. (1976). Soviet Tactical Air Doctrine. Air War College.
Kainakara, P. S. (2005). Russian Concept of Air Warfare: The Impact of Ideology on the Development of Air Power. University of Adelaide.
Pogorelyi, Major M. (1991). From a Military Observer’s Viewpoint: What the War Showed. Moscow: Red Star.
Soviet Military Aircraft Maintenance: An Intelligence Assessment. (1979). National Foreign Assessment Center Central Intelligence Agency.
The Development of Soviet Air Defense Practice. (1983). Sandia National Labs Albuquerque.
The Economics of Soviet Aircraft Maintenance. (1979). Office of Strategic Research Central Intelligence Agency.
