Adolf Tolkachev: The Man Who Killed Soviet Aircraft Reputation
As we all know, the US and its allies had a winning streak over numerous air forces of the third world countries for the last four decades, such as Libya, Iraq, Yugoslavia, etc. In March 1986, US Navy aircraft flying out of their aircraft carriers out-flew, out-maneuvered, and jammed the Libyan Arab Air Force so badly that the Libyans stopped flying their interceptors over the Gulf of Sidra. As a result, Tripoli had to give up its claim on this part of the Mediterranean. Equally damaging, the lack of air cover allowed the Americans to attack with relative impunity. Consider the Americans’ sound defeat of Libyan forces.
On March 24, 1986 — having already cleared the air space over the Gulf of Sidra — US Navy planes easily knocked out a Libyan SA-5 Gammon surface-to-air missile site at Sidra and then sank several fast missile craft of the Libyan navy. Only a month later, US Air Force F-111Fs bombed three carefully-selected targets in Tripoli, while Navy A-6E Intruders struck two targets in Benghazi. Despite fierce resistance from Libyan air defenses, the US lost only one of their fighter-bombers. Adding insult to injury, in January 1989, a pair of US Navy F-14A Tomcats shot down two Libyan air force MiG-23MF interceptors.
The US winning streak continued through the 1990s. In 1991, US airpower overwhelmed the Iraqi air force in a matter of three days. After flying just a few defensive missions, the Iraqi air force was all but grounded and subsequently evacuated its most precious aircraft to Iran.
These are only some out of about a dozen examples in which US airpower overwhelmed its opponents in the last 40 years. Now, one could argue that the opponents in question were no match for the Americans — that they were poorly trained, poorly commanded, inexperienced, and equipped with downgraded export models of Soviet-made aircraft and armament.
Well-informed Iraqi and Libyan sources counter this impression, insisting that their air forces possessed modern equipment operated by well-trained and skilled officers and pilots. Most of the adversaries — although being third-world countries — were one of the most powerful and experienced air forces in the world. Libyan Air Force had some experience from the Arab-Israeli Wars and also Libyan-Chad War. The other adversary, the Iraqi Air Force, was once the fourth-largest air force in the world with numerous experiences from multiple wars, especially the Iran-Iraq War. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqis even managed to shot down five of the then-state-of-the-art US-made F-14A Tomcats of the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF). So, what exactly is the reason if it was not for the lack of training and experience?
Some say that by the late 1990s, Iraqi air defenses were so worn out and so constrained by nonsensical orders from top political leaders that they posed a greater danger to themselves than to their opponents. Except in a handful of cases, Iraq’s elaborate ground-based air defenses — patiently developed at great cost over nearly 20 years — proved no major hindrance to U.S. forces.
Others would stress that the low-quality equipment provided by the Soviets is part of the reason. Yes, it was true that the Soviets — even though was happily exporting some of its new equipment — supplied the adversaries with downgraded equipment. One of the examples of the downgraded equipment is the MiG-29A(9.12B). The MiG-29 of that version is different from the version that the Soviets themselves used and has initial production radar, no ECM (electronic countermeasure), and no IFF (identification friend-or-foe — a device that could differentiate between friend and foes). But even low-quality equipment could still cause havoc if the one facing it does not have a clue about its ability.
Leaving aside details about aircraft and equipment, training, tactics, strategy, politics, and other background noise, one thing remains common in all these occurrences: US forces’ exceptional level of knowledge about the Soviet and Russian weapons systems used by the Libyans, Iraqis, and Serbs.
For example, the pilots of the US Navy A-7E Corsair IIs that attacked the Libyan SA-5 Gammon SAM site near Sidra during the evening of March 24, 1986, knew the exact performance specs of the system they were facing. Likewise, the crews of the two F-14A Tomcats that shot down a pair of Libyan MiG-23MFs had intricate knowledge of the swing-wing MiG-23. US Air Force F-15 pilots hunting MiGs over Iraq in the period 1991 to 2002 knew precisely what their opponents’ aircraft, avionics, and armament were capable of doing.
You could still chalk up the Americans’ success to superior training and tactics, but do not dismiss another potentially important factor — espionage. Evidence indicates that superior intelligence was the key to American military successes. Consider that the tactical manuals that the US Air Force Fighter Weapons School issued in the late 1980s were already well-informed about even the latest Soviet equipment, including the MiG-29, Su-27, SA-10 Grumble, SA-11 Gadfly, and many others. By the mid-1980s, the US military had obtained reams of vital intelligence on Soviet-made weaponry, particularly aircraft and related systems, from Adolf Georgievich Tolkachev, a disgruntled Soviet engineer. Tolkachev was, arguably, the man who killed the Soviet aircraft reputation.
Tolkachev provided much of the most useful intelligence. In the 1970s and ’80s, he was an electronics engineer at the Soviet Union’s Scientific Research Institute of Radar, better known as the Phazotron Design Bureau — the USSR’s main developer of military radars and avionics.
Motivated by the persecution of his wife’s parents under Joseph Stalin and disappointed in the communist government, Tolkachev established ties to the US Central Intelligence Agency in Moscow and, beginning in 1979, began transferring huge volumes of highly classified and extremely sensitive data about the most important avionics, radars, and weapons installed in Soviet-made combat aircraft. Tolkachev gave the CIA complete detailed information about such projects as the R-23, R-24, R-33, R-27, and R-60, S-300; fighter-interceptor aircraft radars used on the MiG-29 Fulcrum, MiG-31 Foxhound, and Su-27 Flanker; and other avionics. The detailed information-enabled US scientists and engineers to quickly develop electronic countermeasures against these systems.
The amount of material that “Donald,” as Tolkachev was known to the CIA, was such that U.S. translators couldn’t keep up with it. They remained busy translating and studying the information Tolkachev had provided well into the 1990s.
As early as December 1979, the U.S. Defense Department completely reconfigured the electronics package for one of its latest fighter aircraft, based on the information from Tolkachev. The U.S. Air Force completely reversed direction on a $70 million electronics package for their then-most-advanced air superiority fighter, the F-15 Eagle, as a result of Tolkachev’s intelligence. Because of that, the F-15C/D was born.
An internal CIA evaluation from March 1980 praised Tolkachev’s information on the latest generation of Soviet surface-to-air missile systems. “We never before obtained such detail and understanding of such systems until years after they were actually deployed,” the CIA stressed. In April 1980, another internal CIA memorandum called Tolkachev’s information on jam-proofing tests for Soviet fighter aircraft radar systems “unique.” Obviously, Tolkachev provided data that no other CIA asset had access to. Only a few months later, Tolkachev was credited with “providing unique information on a new Soviet fighter aircraft, and documents on several new models of airborne missile systems.” Similarly, a memorandum from the Defense Department from September 1980 praised the impact of Tolkachev’s reporting as “limitless in terms of enhancing US military systems’ effectiveness.” Tolkachev’s leaks had the “potential to save lives and equipment” and were “instrumental in shaping the course of billions of dollars of US research and development activities.”
The extent of the damage Tolkachev caused the Soviets is hard to summarize in a few sentences. Little did the CIA release its cooperation with Tolkachev, indicating that he might have inflicted irreparable harm to the Soviet military aviation and air-defense industries.
The Tolkachev affair severely hit the MiG-29 Fulcrum, and the Soviets reacted by fielding the MiG-29SMT. However, such efforts were far from satisfactory, while a lack of funding caused delays lasting decades. Although a small number of Fulcrums continue to be upgraded — Poland’s MiGs are receiving new mission computers, navigation technology, and even a Rockwell Collins UHF/VHF radio — other air forces, except for an inordinate number of former Soviet-aligned states, never queued up to buy the Fulcrum after the cold war. “The MiG-29 really got exposed with the fall of the Iron Curtain,” US pilot Fred “Spanky,” Clifton says. “You don’t see further foreign sales. Who has bought it? Nobody”.
The defeat of Libyan, Iraqi, and Yugoslav Air Force — with the affair being one of the reasons — also caused worldwide distrust for Soviet-built aircraft and now Russian-built aircraft. Even until now, some would even go as far as saying that upgraded and most sophisticated Russian-built aircraft still does not stand a chance against the US and its allies-built aircraft. This also led to most third-world countries buying the US-built F-16 aircraft to fulfill the need for reliable combat aircraft instead of Russian-built MiG-29 or Su-27.
Perhaps more importantly, the Tolkachev affair hit the Soviet Union at a time of instability for the USSR. A Soviet spy in the United States revealed Tolkachev’s own spying in early 1985. The Soviet government executed Tolkachev in 1986.
References:
- Halberstadt, Hans. 1992. Mikoyan MiG-29: Design and Development of Russia’s Super Fighter. Motorbooks International. ISBN: 9780879386566.
- Hoffmann, David. 2015. The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and Betrayal. New York: Doubleday. ISBN 978–0385537605.
- Lambeth, Benjamin. 1990. Pilot Report: MiG-29. California: RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies.
- Sotham, John. 2014. The Truth About the MiG-29: How U.S. Intelligence Services Solved the Mystery of a Cold War Killer. Air & Space Magazine.
